

pramāṇa as valid cognition (*samyagjñāna*) is cognition causing a person to make an act (*pravartaka*) on the object, namely cognition causing a person to attain (*prāpaka*) the object, which is equated with cognition showing the object of the act and with cognition discriminating the object. On the other hand, a result of valid cognition is the function (*vyāpāra*) of such cognition for causing a person to attain the object, which is equated with the fact of showing the object of the act (*pravṛttiviśayapradarśana*) and with cognition of the object (*arthādhigati*).

Secondly, I inquire into the object of the act and the discrimination in view of two kinds of objects of direct perception, that is, the object that is directly grasped (*grāhya*), existing momentarily, and the object of judgment (*adhyavaseya*), having a temporal span. This view is typical of Dharmottara. The result shows that the object of both act and discrimination is the object of judgment, which is closely related with an achievement of a purpose (*arthakriyā*).

Finally, I attempt to demonstrate the position of cognition of the object in the process of direct perception, applying the same kind of relation as these two object to that between cognition of the object and judgment. In the process of direct perception, non-conceptual direct perception having the form of the object matter (ex. the blue) arises at first, and then conceptual cognition arises, which judges the precedent direct perception. The fact that the precedent direct perception is of a certain object (ex. the blue) is ascertained only if the later conceptual cognition judges it. Therefore, The cognition of the object itself exists as non-conceptual, but it is all but conceptual because it is cognition of a certain object is ascertained by conceptual cognition.

What is *abhāvapramā* in the demonstration of *svaprakāśa* in the Advaitavedānta school?: In contrast to *viparyaya*

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I previously contributed an article about the demonstration of *vijñāna svaprakāśatā* seen in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* (Kh), which was written to Śrīharṣa (ca. 12th) of the Advaitavedānta school. In that case, evidence is found in the Kh for the conception of the right cognition of negation (*vyatirekapramā*), which is hardly found in other texts of the Advaitavedānta school, so I contributed the article about this conception. In that article, it becomes clear that this conception is the right cognition of nonexistence of cognition (*abhāvapramā*) and possesses the problem of whether it is *svaprakāśa* or not. But I could not examine the similarities and differences between *abhāvapramā* with an error (*viparyaya*) and *abhāvapramā*, so I consider the difference between *abhāvapramā* and *viparyaya* in this article.

Moreover, I clarify the role *abhāvapramā* plays in *svaprakāśa* of the Advaitavedānta school by examining Citsukha's (ca. 13th) *Tattvapradīpikā* (TP). Similar to the Kh, this work discusses *abhāvapramā* and *viparyaya* as evidence of *vijñāna svaprakāśatā*. By examining Kh and TP, it becomes clear that there are parallel arguments in both texts and that in this debate *viparyaya* and *abhāvapramā* (*vyatirekapramā*, *viparītapramā*) are consistent with each other. As a result, I conclude that the difference between *abhāvapramā* and *viparyaya* is as follows.

First, if cognition is present and if it is known correctly, then correct knowledge occurs. However, if *viparyaya* occurs when that cognition is not accurately known, then this *viparyaya* is knowledge that is incorrectly recognized as opposed to the content of cognition. On the other hand, when *abhāvapramā* occurs it is unrelated to the content of recognition and cognition that such cognition itself does not exist occurs. As described above, the difference between *abhāvapramā* and *viparyaya* is whether there is the recognition that the content of cognition is incorrect in regards to the cognition of the object, or whether it is incorrect knowledge about the presence or absence of cognition.

As a result of the above considerations, it becomes clear that *abhāvapramā* in the demonstration of *svaprakāśa* in the Advaitavedānta school is, unlike *viparyaya* that is related to the recognizing of content, the knowledge related to the presence or absence of cognition of the object. Then, *abhāvapramā* is the correct knowledge of the absence of the cognition of subject, but by saying that *abhāvapramā* does not exist, scholars of the Advaitavedānta school tried to claim that cognition that is the subject is always present.

Dharmakīrti's interpretation of *nigrahassthāna* (2): On *adoṣodbhāvana*

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Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660) defined "the condition of defeat" (*nigrahassthāna*) — a traditional concept in the art of debate — from a totally new viewpoint in his work *Vādanyāya* (VN). He divided it into *asāadhanāṅgavacana*, the condition of defeat for proponents, and *adoṣodbhāvana*, the condition of defeat for opponents. This compels us then to conclude that a proponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to *asāadhanāṅgavacana* and an opponent is judged to be defeated when his behavior corresponds to *adoṣodbhāvana*, according to the terms of debate set up in the VN. However, based on the descriptions supplied in the VN, this conclusion must in fact be wrong.

The conditions of victory or defeat in debate in the VN should not be clarified only through an analysis of *asāadhanāṅgavacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana*. We have to disentangle the relationship between